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The Return of the Repressed? 
South America in the Age of US Supremacy 
JORGE ROGACHEVSKY 
this time, South America fmds it 
elf steeped in the quagmire of its 
wn historical failures, a situation 
fraught with both promise and danger. Eco-
nomic chaos could give way to social chaos 
and ultra-right political shifts. On the other 
hand, new alternatives for progressive so-
cial change could emerge, at a time when 
few such options appear to be taking root 
anywhere else in the world. The United 
States will certainly play a key role in any 
future developments, just as it holds signifi-
cant responsibility for the failures of the 
past. 
Three South American societies-Ar-
gentina, Colombia, and Venezuela-show 
the overall limitations of US policy towards 
Latin America. Each in its own way threat-
ens to dismantle the post-Cold War policy 
framework developed by the United States. 
US Historical Role as Co-Conspirator 
To understand the present and what the 
future might bring, it's important to reca-
pitulate the role of the United States as a 
co-conspirator in the history of atrocities 
that precedes the current moment. 
In the 1970s, an unprecedented chal-
lenge to US hegemony in Latin America 
appeared. In South America, 1970 saw the 
election of Salvador Allende, a Socialist 
heading a left-wing coalition. Three years 
later, Argentina's military rulers had to give 
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So8idaridad This was not the path chosen. Start-ing with the over-
throw of Allende and 
his replacement with 
the brutal Pinochet 
dictatorship in 1973, 
the United States de-
cided to fight the 
revolutionary fire 
spreading through 
Latin America by 
throwing dynamite 
on the flames. The 
result was an un-
precedented wave of 
repression in a con-Workers' solidarity movements have been rising in Argentina. 
Graphic courtesy of Centro de Midia lndependente tinent with a long 
and sad experience of dictatorial rule. More 
than 3,000 people were disappeared and 
killed in Chile according to official ac-
counts. 
way and allow the installation as president 
of strong-man Juan Domingo Peron, after 
almost 20 years in exile. Little links Peron 
and Allende directly, except that histori-
cally both represent, from opposite poles, 
a populist and nationalist resistance to US 
control of Latin America's economic and 
social resources. 
The United States could have taken nu-
merous paths to confront these challenges. 
In Chile, for example, the United States 
could have accepted the democratic will 
expressed by its people, and looked for 
ways to engage constructively the govern-
ment of Salvador Allende, a highly cul-
tured, principled, and democratically-
minded political leader. 
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As military rule spread from Guatemala 
to Tierra del Fuego, progressive social 
movements were dismantled, and revolu-
tionary movements were stymied. 
In the 1980s, though, new dangers mani-
fested themselves, as the remedy used to 
fight the "disease" of social transformation 
began to have unintended side-effects. 
Military corporatism was unstable. It could 
tilt towards left-leaning populism, as was 
the case with Omar Torrijos in Panama. It 
could also embrace right-wing nationalism, 
continued on page two 
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The Return of the Repressed? 
continued from page one 
as the pampered Argentine military dem-
onstrated. To stem a wave of increasing do-
mestic unrest, the Argentine military de-
cided to cash in its chips after having per-
fected the dirty war in the Southern Cone 
and then moving on to train and advise the 
Guatemalan army and the Nicaraguan 
contras, by invading the Malvinas in 1982. 
It took a full-scale war mobilization on the 
part of the British-and major US intelli-
gence support-to put the Argentine mili-
tary in its place. 
That place, however, could no longer 
be as guarantors of the Pax Americana. 
Moreover, as the Cold War reached its 
whimpering climax, it would hardly do for 
the United States to promote "democrati-
zation" in Eastern Europe while tying itself 
to some of the most murderous govern-
ments on earth; neither was it sound policy 
to continue investing US resources in mili-
tarizing Latin America and stifling not only 
dangerous social change but also profit-
able economic activity. The US slowly dis-
tanced itself from its former military allies 
and promoted a process of pacification and 
democratization. 
For the US government, the 1990s be-
came the era of self-congratulatory postur-
ing. The sudden and profound collapse of 
·the former Soviet Union left the United 
States as the sole military and economic 
superpower. With progressive social 
change effectively suppressed in Latin 
America, the United States supported 
democratic rule, which favored the return 
to power of the traditional managerial politi-
cal class or the traditional economic elites, 
both of which sectors would ally them-
selves with neo-liberal economic policies. 
The elements of the neo-liberal formula 
were tightly interrelated: 
1) Fight inflation by reducing government 
spending and maintaining tight monetary 
controls; 
2) Reduce spending by decreasing public 
services and reducing government employment; 
3) Increase competition by divesting the 
state of the public sector and reducing or 
eliminating tariffs and duties; 
4) Reduce the leverage of the labor movement 
by reducing the size of the public workforce 
and creating greater competition for jobs; 
5) Promote investment confidence by re-
ducing the cost of labor, maintaining tight 
monetary controls, and granting major tax 
concessions; 
Page 2 
Members of the Venezuelan Presidential 
Guard raise the flag after a coup attempt 
on Hugo Chavez. Photo courtesy of 
Independent Media Center .Brazil 
6) Fill in any threatening cracks in the neo-
liberal economic dike through a major pro-
gram of state borrowing facilitated by the 
implementation of measures 1-5. 
That formula had led to the so-called 
"economic miracle" in Chile, and the US 
promoted it as the cure for a century of 
economic woes in Latin America. And, for 
a generation of technocrats uplifted by 
Mary J?oppins' intonation that "a _spoonful 
of sugar makes the medicine go down," the 
neo-liberal medicine was coated with ave-
neer of democracy. It became a self-affirm-
ing mantra of US officialdom in the 1990s, 
and into the beginning of this new cen-
tury, that Latin America was now safely en-
sconced within the democratic camp (with 
the salient exception of Cuba, of course). 
This highly self-serving and optimistic 
assessment has been severely tested in the 
first months of the new century. 
Colombia 
. Colombia is in the throes of the long-
est-lasting military conflict in the Ameri-
cas, a civil war that began almost 40 years 
ago. Of the four major armed sectors in 
Colombia today, the largest is the security 
apparatus, consisting of about a quarter 
million troops distributed among the mili-
tary branches and the National Police. Con-
fronting this apparatus are two major guer-
rilla organizations: the FARC (Fuerzas Ar-
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madas Revolucionarias de Colombia) 
numbers 15-20,000 armed combatants, the 
ELN (Ejercito de Liberaci6n Nacional) has 
approximately 5,000 troops. 
In addition to these more "traditional" 
combatants, paramilitary organizations be-
gun to crop up in the 1980s under the pay-
roll of drug traffickers. Despite being de-
clared illegal in 1989 due to their extreme 
brutality, these forces have continued to 
grow, and in 1997 merged into a unified 
command known as the AUC (Auto-
defensas Unidas de Colombia), with ap-
proximately 8,000 combatants. The AUC 
is the fastest growing armed group in Co-
lombia, and by far the most bloodthirsty. 
Even though all combatants in the Colom-
bian conflict are accused of carrying out 
atrocities, the Colombian Commission of 
Jurists found that the paramilitaries were 
responsible for 79 percent of the deaths and 
disappearances of non-combatants in 2000, 
compared with 16 percent for the guerrillas 
and almost 5 percent for the military. 1 (The 
relatively low level of atrocities directly as-
cribed to the Colombian military is not a 
signal of its adherence to human rights 
continued on page three 
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The Return of the Repressed? 
continued from page two 
principles; even the US State Department 
has acknowledged that there is often sig-
nificant cooperation between military of-
ficers and the AUC.) In 2000 alone, over 
26,000 people died as a result of the vio-
lence, or 1 out of every 1,500 inhabitants; 
a comparable death rate from terrorist ac-
tivities for the United States would have 
produced 187,000 victims in this country. 
Given the staggering level of violence 
that the protracted armed conflict in Co-
lombia has generated, and the very real 
danger that the spiral could generate even 
greater levels of atrocities, one might hope 
that the US government would search for 
a peaceful resolution to the decades-long war. 
And in fact this is what the State Department 
itself proposed in a May 17, 2001 report: 
Support for the Colombian peace pro-
cess remains a vital element of US 
policy. Despite the slow progress made 
to date, the peace process represents 
Colombia s best chance to escape the 
forty-year cycle of violence. A military 
solution is not a viable option, as 
Colombia s armed forces are not strong 
enough to defeat these groups of ir-
regular forces with increasing income 
from drug trafficking. 2 
However, the last thing on the agenda, 
in Washington and in Bogota, is negotiat-
ing with the rebels. The lame-duck govern-
ment of President Andres Pastrana broke 
off negotiations with the FARC last Febru-
ary and with the ELN in May. Each side 
assigned the other with responsibility for 
the breakdown of the peace process. In 
May, Alvaro Uribe Velez won the election 
after campaigning on a hard-line policy of 
escalating the war against the guerrillas. 
Uribe, who is to become president on Au-
gust 7, 2002, is reputed to have received 
support from the A UC during his campaign. 
At the same time, the Bush Administra-
tion is set to fuel the Colombian fires even 
further. On July 2, Otto Reich, Undersecretary 
of State for Latin American Affairs, asserted 
that Uribe will need "to take the war to the 
guerrillas," according to the Los Angeles 
Times. 3 The United States has already con-
tributed almost $2 billion to Colombia's 
military in the past five years, and Bush has 
asked Congress for upwards of $500 mil-
lion more for 2003. Colombia is the third 
largest recipient of US military aid. In ad-
dition, the Bush administration has asked 
Congress to expand the anti-narcotics fo-
Vol. 11, #6 
cus of funding to include anti-terrorism. 
These elements are familiar. In Colom-
bia, the United States is following its Cen-
tralAmerican policies from the 1980s, fight-
ing fire with dynamite. Given the regional 
context surrounding Colombia, it becomes 
clear why the United States has set its 
sights so closely on that nation. 
Just to the north lies Panama, still a ma-
riots left 277 civilians dead. Subsequently, 
the Perez administration was accused of 
corruption. In 1993, the Attorney General 
indicted the president for misappropriation 
of funds. The Supreme Court removed 
Perez from office so that he could be tried, 
and he was eventually found guilty. 
Hugo Chavez spent two years in jail for 
his participation in the failed coup attempt. 
In Colombia, the United States is following 
its Central American policies from the 
1980s, fighti~g fire with dynamite. 
jor trade and strategic resource for the US. 
Wounds of the senior Bush Administration's 
invasion of Panama in 1989 are still very 
much open inside that nation. To the south 
lies Ecuador and the promise of major oil 
reserves. Ecuador has experienced severe 
economic and social disruptions that have 
brought about an ongoing political crisis. 
No president has served out a normal four-
year term since 1996. The current president, 
Gustavo Noboa, came to power after a 
highly organized indigenous sector helped 
force the resignation of the elected head-
of-state, Jamil Mahauada. And to Colombia's 
east lies Venezuela, the third largest sup-
plier of oil to the United States, and a coun-
try facing significant social upheaval. 
Venezuela 
Venezuela presents a different challenge 
to the United States. If Colombia replays 
the scenario made familiar in Central 
America, Venezuela, in the figure of the 
current president, Hugo Chavez, harks back 
to the tradition of nationalist, charismatic, 
ex-military leadership. Chavez is treading 
the path of the aforementioned Trujillo and 
Peron, looking to forge a policy indepen-
dent of Washington's dictates and work-
ing on a foundation of grassroots support 
as leverage to internal elite opposition. 
Hugo Chavez came to prominence in 
1992 when, as an officer in a paratroop regi-
ment, he led an attempted coup against the 
highly unpopular government of Carlos 
Andres Perez. Perez's second presidential 
term had begun inauspiciously in Febru-
ary 1989, when he attempted to implement 
austerity measures imposed by the Inter-
national Monetary Fund (IMF). Ensuing 
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However, the popularity of the attack 
against a broadly reviled old-camp politi-
cian was demonstrated in 1998. Chavez 
won the presidency of Venezuela with 56 
percent of the vote. He then moved quickly 
to capitalize on his momentum and cha-
risma to push forward his "Bolivarian 
Revolution." Chavez called for a Constitu-
ent Assembly to draft a new constitution, 
and his supporters gained 121 out of 128 
seats in the assembly. In 2000 Chavez was 
reelected under the new constitution, this 
time receiving almost 60 percent of the 
vote to begin a six-year term. 
Like Peron, Chavez seems to be attempt-
ing to implement a policy of independence 
from Washington, looking for allies where 
he can find them. When released from 
prison in 1994 he visited and was warmly 
received by Fidel Castro in Cuba; the two 
maintain a warm relationship. After winning 
his second bid for the presidency, Chavez 
was the first head-of-state since the Gulf 
War to visit with Saddam Hussein in Iraq. 
Domestically, Chavez has consolidated his 
government by implementing the consti-
tutional revisions, maintaining grassroots 
Bolivarian committees, reshuffling key ex-
ecutive appointments, as well as promot-
ing tepid economic reforms in contrast to a 
more combative rhetoric. James Petras, well-
know Latin American scholar, has summed 
up Chavez's reforms as follows: 
The key point to remember is Chavez s 
record on domestic policy. Hes in-
creased spending/or housing, schools, 
and health. Hes increased income by a 
small margin-3 or 4 percent. Hes in-
creased taxes to some limited degree, 
continued on page ten 
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Plan Pueblo Panama Threatens Region 
Inter American Development Bank Paves Latin America 
BRENDAN O'NEILL 
The InterAmerican Development Bank (IDB) is literally paving the way for cor-
porate globalization in Latin America with 
the Plan Puebla Panama (PPP). The PPP, 
and its southern twin, the Regional Infra-
structure Integration Initiative (IIRSA), are 
a new package of corporate-led develop-
ment projects threatening the social and 
ecological integrity of Latin America. The 
IDB has recently crowned both the PPP 
and URSA as their two priority "regional 
integration" projects for Latin America. 
The PPP and URSA, massive infrastruc-
ture projects, lay the foundation upon 
which "free trade" can be built and ex-
panded to encompass what is nearly the 
entire geographical area of the Free Trade 
Area of the Americas (FTAA). The FTAA 
proposes to extend the misery of the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 
to 34 countries in Central and South 
America. The PPP and URSA are a package 
of megaproj ects that include: the construc-
tion of hydroelectric dams in indigenous 
territories, the dredging of deep water ports 
in fragile ocean ecosystems, the paving of 
high-impact roadways through indigenous 
communities and currently intact rainforest 
ecosystems, and the creation of sweat-
shops throughout the region. These 
projects, coordinated by the IDB, will be 
funded by a combination of sources, in-
cluding development bank loans, private 
corporations and public institutions. 
The Central American Free Trade Agree-
ments (CAFTA) is a complementary plan 
to the PPP, also being pushed by the 
InterAmerican Development Bank. As 
Enrique Iglesias, President of the IDB re-
marked at a June meeting at its headquar-
ters in Washington, DC, "A free trade agree-
ment would strengthen Central America's 
position as a destination for foreign inves-
tors interested in accessing the US mar-
ket." Also present at the meeting were rep-
resentatives from the more infamous cor-
porate globalization institutions, including 
the WTO and the World Bank, to discuss 
and collaborate on plans for corporate glo-
balization in Central America. 
Any advancement in the PPP, URSA, as 
well as CAFTA, is a step towards passing 
the FTAA. Conversely, opposition and al-
ternatives to any one of these free trade 
Reading the Alphabet Soup 
plans offers the possibility of creating lo-
cally based, socially and ecologically just 
alternatives. While the anti-globalization 
movement has targeted, with reason, the 
WTO, World Bank and IMF for their roles 
as champions of globalization, there also 
exist regional globalizers, including the IDB, 
that need to be included as pressure points 
in the social and ecological justice move-
ments. Furthermore, while opposition to 
the FTAA has been strong, there is a need 
to expand analysis and awareness of the 
relationships and interconnections between 
the PPP, URSA, CAFTA and the FTAA. 
Development for and by Whom? 
Plan Puebla Panama (PPP) is a "regional 
integration and development" project origi-
nally proposed by Mexico's President, 
Vicente Fox, to create a link from Puebla, 
Mexico, all the way to Panama with north-
south industrial and transportation corri-
dors running along the Pacific Coast. The 
PPP also proposes a series of"dry canals" 
running east-west across Southern Mexico 
and Central America as well as the creation 
of key industrial development zones 
throughout the region. Dry canals are high-
Below is a partial listing of the abbreviated names relevant 
to Colombia and US/transnational policy in the region. 
made available after the recipients have agreed to policy 
reforms in their economies through a structural adjustment 
program. 
CAFTA-The US/Central America Free Trade Agreement is 
currently being negotiated. President Bush has referred to 
CAFTA as a top priority for his administration, as it will help 
move forward FTAA. 
FTAA-Free Trade Area of the Americas is a proposed trade 
agreement scheduled to be implemented no later than 2005 
that will encompass the all of the Americas from Alaska down 
to the tip of South America's Tierra del Fuego. Some oppo-
nents have called it "NAFTA on Steroids." 
IDB-The Inter American Bank, the oldest and largest regional 
multilateral development institution, was established in 1959 
to "help accelerate economic and social development in Latin 
America and the Caribbean" and is the main entity promot-
ing the PPP as well as providing funding for the URSA. 
IMF-International Monetary Fund, established in 1945, sup-
plies member states with loans to help them overcome short-
term balance-of-payments difficulties. Such money is only 
URSA-Regional Infrastructure Integration Initiative, the 
PPP's southern cousin, is a regional infrastructure develop-
ment scheme for a large part of South America. 
NAFTA-North American Free Trade Agreement is the major 
trade agreement that went into effect in 1994 between the 
US, Canada and Mexico which has cost tens of thousands 
of workers in the US their jobs, lowered environmental stan-
dards and devastated communities throughout North 
America. 
PPP-Plan Puebla Panama is a massive regional infrastruc-
ture development scheme that is planned to go from Puebla, 
Mexico all the way through Panama. 
WTO-World Trade Organization, established in 1995, is a 
powerful international body that develops and enforces rules 
for trade and investment. It promotes the "free trade" agenda 
of multinational corporations above the interests of local 
communities, working families, and the environment. 
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Plan Pueblo Panama Threatens Region 
ways and railways that connect ports on 
both coasts of the Isthmus, and threaten 
to displace rural indigenous peoples and 
destroy ecosystems of the region. 
Officially, there are 8 initiatives of the 
PPP: 1) Sustainable Development, 2) Hu-
man Development, 3) Natural Disaster Pre-
vention, 4) Tourism Promotion, 5) Trade 
Facilitation, 6) Road Integration, 7) Energy 
Interconnection, 8) Telecommunications 
Development. However, only two initiatives 
seem to be drawing time or resources from 
the Interamerican Development Bank: en-
ergy interconnection and road integration. 
These two initiatives have received over 
80% of total PPP investment thus far, dem-
onstrating that they are the two most valu-
able plans for investment capital. The re-
gional energy grid is being pushed and 
primarily funded by the IDB and the Span-
ish multinational corporation ENDESA. 
However, Applied Energy Services, Duke 
Energy and Harken Energy are also jock-
eying for position to invest in the newly 
privatized energy market. 
The highway and infrastructure initia-
tive is being funded by the IDB and World 
Bank, among others. One of the most con-
troversial highway projects includes a "dry 
canal"(highway and high speed railway to 
ship goods) that will run through the Isth-
mus of Tehuantepec in Southern Mexico, 
connecting the Pacific port of Salinas Cruz 
with the Atlantic port of Coatzacoalcos. 
Indigenous organizations such as the Or-
ganization of Indigenous Communities of 
the Northern Zone of the Isthmus (UCIZONI) 
ha e adamately rejected the Isthmus of 
Tehuantepec dry canal declaring: "The Isth-
mus is not for sale!" Resistance to mega-
projects by UCIZONI and other indigenous 
groups had organized long before the PPP 
was officially announced. 
From March 4-18, 2002, Action for Com-
munity and Ecology in the Regions of Cen-
tral America ( ACER CA) led a fact-finding 
delegation to Nicaragua's North Atlantic 
Autonomous Region (RAAN). The indig-
enous communities living in the region are 
currently threatened by specific projects 
of the PPP. The expansion of the Bilwi-
Puerto-Cabezas port could potentially 
transform the port into the largest in the 
Caribbean. A private US corporation call-
ing itselfDELASA is amajorplayerbehind 
this $150 million, three-part business plan 
that threatens to irrevocably alter the en-
tire region. DELASA revealed its plans to 
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Forests like this one near Rosita, Nicaragua are being decimated. If the PPP goes 
through, the region may suffer more environmental devastation. Photo by Orin Lange/le/ 
ACERCA-ASEJ 
the ACERCA delegation: enlarge and pave 
the new Managua to Bilwi road, expand 
and dredge the port, and displace nearby 
communities to create an export-process-
ing-zone in Bilwi-Puerto-Cabezas. Strong 
indigenous resistance in the region to these 
projects includes ACERCA's partners, the 
Sumu/Mayagna indigenous community 
organization SUKAWALA, and the Nation 
of Mosquitia Consejo de Ancianos. 
Resistance to the PPP 
Critics of the PPP argue that, like the 
FTAA and NAFTA, the PPP has been cre-
ated by a handful of regional political and 
corporate elites. They argue that the IDB 
has intentionally excluded those who will 
be impacted the most by the creation of 
the project and point out that the IDB has 
held only token "consultations" offered only 
to hand-chosen organizations in the region. 
With every proposal of the PPP, whether in 
the form of a hydroelectric dam that dis-
places indigenous peoples, the privatization 
of natural resources, the creation of sweat-
shops, or the construction of"dry canals," 
there is solidarity, resistance and alterna-
tives being built from the bottom up. 
For example, at the November 2001 forum 
against globalization and the PPP held in Gua-
temala, Bertha Caceres, a Lenca indigenous 
activist from the Civic Council of Popular 
and Indigenous Organizations of Hondu-
ras, read part of the forums' final declaration: 
For the men and women present at the 
Xelaju Forum, the PPP is a ready-made 
geopolitical project to build, in Meso-
america, an area of services and in-
frastructure, designed according to the 
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logic of transnational corporations, na-
tional oligarchy groups and interna-
tional financial institutions. The cen-
tral axes of this project are a services 
infrastructure for the export of goods 
and the exploitation of our natural re-
sources, our bio-diversity and the la-
bor of our peoples. The PPP does not 
respond in any way to the social logic 
of the Mesoamerican people and their 
communities. 
ACERCA participated in the third forum 
against globalization and the PPP in 
Managua, Nicaragua last month. At the 
meetingACERCA coordinated an exchange 
in Managua between the Atlantic Coast In-
digenous peoples and another of 
ACERCA's partner organizations, UCIZONI, 
from Oaxaca, Mexico. The indigenous-to-
indigenous exchanges are an important part 
of ACERCA's work. This exchange in 
Managua will create a space for important 
dialogue between indigenous communities 
of the region to share common experiences 
and coordinate action for mutual goals of 
autonomy, self-determination and ecologi-
cal justice in their communities. 
Brendan O'Neill works at Action for 
Community and Ecology in the Regions 
of Central America (ACERCA), which 
received a grant from RESIST this year. 
For more information contact ACERCA 
at acerca@sover.net, www.acerca.org. 
Information from this article comes from 
interviews with ACERCA partners and 
DELASA representatives, "Supplement 
E-bulletin ... " (March-April 2002) 
available on line at www.interaction.org. 
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Peace through Solidarity 
CUSLAR Works to Change US Policy in Colombia 
MARCIE LEY 
Javier Sanchez, a representative of the Peace Community of San Jose de 
Apartado, Colombia, spoke these words 
during a recent visit to Ithaca, New York: 
We made a decision: first, to defend our 
lands and also to resist becoming in-
volved in the war. It wasn 'tan easy deci-
sion to make or follow through with but 
despite all of our hardship, we know why 
we are doing this and why we continue 
with our struggle. 
Part of a national tour organized by the 
Fellowship of Reconciliation, Javier's stop 
in Ithaca was sponsored by a local group, 
the Committee on US-Latin American Re-
lations (CULSAR). As the oldest continu-
ously active solidarity organization in the 
country, CUSLAR's mission is to raise 
awareness about the effects of US policy 
toward Latin America. We believe that one 
of the most powerful means to educate 
people about US foreign policy is to hear 
the stories of those that are directly affected 
by such policies. Javier's visit gave us a 
first-hand perspective on the violence that 
ravages his people. 
Ask most people living in the United 
States what Colombia is like and the inevi-
table reply is that it is a land of drugs, vio-
lence and guerrillas. For someone who pays 
moderately close attention to the main-
stream press this picture is fairly accurate, 
for it is more or less all that is presented to 
American audiences. But ask one of the 
more than one million Colombians living 
in the US to tell you something about their 
homeland and you will be greeted by im-
ages of a country tremendously rich in terms 
of cultural traditions, biological diversity, 
and natural resources. This fierce national 
pride may contrast starkly with the popular 
image of a country plagued by violence. Yet 
this richness lies at the heart of the 38-year 
civil war that has driven so many from their 
homes. Whether it be drugs, oil, human la-
bor, access to markets, etc., Colombia has 
something the rest of the world wants. 
Plan Colombia is a Plan to Kill 
For decades the US has maintained a 
strong presence in Colombia and in other 
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Andean countries under the pretext of fight-
ing the War on Drugs. In the last several 
years this involvement has largely taken the 
form of direct military aid to the Colom-
bian government. Of the $1.3 billion proposed 
by the Clinton administration and allocated 
by Congress in 2000 for Plan Colombia, the 
overwhelming majority is designated for 
military equipment and training. The ratio-
nale is that the guerrilla armies, most nota-
bly the F ARC (Armed Revolutionary Forces 
of Colombia), rely on narco-trafficking to 
fund their revolutionary activities. Under 
this logic, destroying the FARC would dev-
astate the Colombian drug trade and signifi-
cantly reduce the amount of cocaine and 
heroin entering the US market. 
For years critics have attacked the sup-
ply-side emphasis of the current drug policy 
as expensive and ineffective. A RAND study 
recently found that it is 26 times more cost 
effective to use education and treatment to 
address the drug problem in the US 
(www.randorg). Furthermore, Colombia's co-
caine production and export has increased 
rather than diminished in recent years. 
Meanwhile in the US the street price for 
cocaine has gone down while purity has 
increased. Clearly, if Plan Colombia's main 
objective is to reduce the supply of drugs in 
this country, billions of our tax dollars have 
been squandered. 
If we stop to consider where this money 
goes we get a clearer picture. Of the $1.3 
billion aid package, $600 million is designated 
for the purchase of helicopters such as the 
Blackhawk which is manufactured by 
Sikorsky, a US-based defense contractor. 
Another $350 million is allocated for mari-
time and aerial interception which often 
takes the form of fumigation. The chemical 
used in aerial spraying is glyphosate, known 
as Ultra-RoundUp, and is manufactured by 
the US-based Monsanto Corporation. And, 
$96 million is budgeted to strengthen the 
Colombian police forces which often re-
ceive training from their US counterparts. 
What this breakdown means is that 
more than half of the money allocated for 
Colombia does not actually leave the US. 
Rather, the majority of this aid to Colom-
bia goes to pay salaries, purchase equip-
ment and supplies, and contract services to 
RESIST Newsletter 
mostly US citizens and corporations. A 
quick look at which interest groups ( defense 
contractors, chemical manufactures) and 
elected officials (such as Sen. Joe 
Leiberman of Connecticut, home of 
Sikorsky) support such an aid package re-
veals what factors really determine our for-
eign policy. Given that the Bush adminis-
tration has requested an additional $567 mil-
lion in mostly military aid, the focus on mili-
tarization will undoubtedly continue to 
dominate the strategy in Colombia. 
For the people of Colombia, however, 
the costs of militarization are extremely 
high. In four decades of civil war, over 
40,000 people have been killed, the major-
ity of whom were civilians. In addition to 
the one million people that have fled the 
country, another 2 million have been inter-
nally displaced due to intolerable levels of 
violence and oppression. As Javier pointed 
out in his presentation to CUSLAR, to be 
forced to leave one's land and move tour-
ban slums with no means of self-sufficiency 
and no community structure is so tragic that 
many choose to remain and suffer the con-
sequences. 
While Colombia is indeed embroiled in 
a civil war, and atrocities are committed by 
all armed actors, it is impossible to place 
blame primarily on the guerrillas. In fact, 
70% of the violence is attributed to the para-
military groups who carry out most of the 
massacres of civilians. The main paramilitary 
group, the AUC (Self-Defense Units of 
Colombia) have been placed on the State 
Department's list of known terrorist groups 
(see "Picking our Enemies: US Doesn't 
Mind Terrorists in Colombia," RESIST 
Newsletter, May 2002). They share this dis-
tinction with the FARC, yet unlike the guer-
rillas the AUC maintains a close relation-
ship with the Colombian Army. It is widely 
acknowledged by paramilitary leaders and 
Colombian government officials that without 
this collaboration, the FARC would control 
far more of the Colombian countryside. 
"We stated our opposition [to Plan Co-
lombia] from the beginning because we 
knew that it is a plan to kill." Javier af-
firms what human rights reports-includ-
ing those prepared by the US State De-
partment-have documented: militariza-
tion leads to violence and the majority of 
the victims are civilians. By supplying the 
Colombian Army with weapons and train-
ing, while acknowledging their strong ties 
to the paramilitaries, the US is essentially 
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funding a war that Colombia is waging on 
its own people. 
They Want Us to Leave Our Land 
During the 1980s and '90s, the FARC 
maintained a strong presence in the north-
ern Uruba area of what is now the Peace 
Community of San Jose deApartado. Javier 
remembers being offered guns by the guer-
rillas as an invitation to join their struggle. 
Nearly everyone in the community refused 
to take up arms. Shortly thereafter, the army 
stepped up its repression of the FARC by 
helping to create and support paramilitary 
groups which also terrorized the commu-
nity. Many of the residents fled, and it 
wasn't until the community took the cou-
rageous step of declaring itself a Peace 
Community that people started to return. 
Those families who came back did so at tre-
mendous risk to their lives, a sacrifice that 
many were willing to make, having experi- . 
enced the poverty and isolation of living 
in urban slums. As Javier points out, "Com-
ing back means returning to their homes 
and lands and being able to work again." 
Despite having declared neutrality, San 
Jose de Apartado continues to suffer per-
secution. The community has seen 107 of 
its members killed, 90% of them by the 
paramilitaries. Recently, a paramilitary 
group blocked the main road into the com-
munity, virtually paralyzing it economically. 
As Javier points out, "The idea is that we 
go hungry so that we abandon our lands. 
Above all, there is economic interest in the 
land." He explains that foreign interests 
pres.sure the government of Colombia to 
allow the establishment of mines and large 
cattle ranches. "We also know well that 
there are large projects being planned like 
a dry canal that will link the two oceans." 
While the location of San Jose de 
Apartado is of strategic interest to many, 
the same can be said about much of the 
country. Control of Colombia's vast natu-
ral resources lie at the heart of the conflict. 
The Bush administration's proposal to al-
locate $98 million to train a Colombian army 
battalion to defend an oil pipeline owned 
by Occidental Petroleum, based in Los 
Angeles, is evidence of the link between 
corporate interests and foreign aid. 
As the FARC pointed out during the 
recently suspended peace negotiations, the 
civil unrest in Colombia will continue until 
the underlying structural inequalities are 
addressed. It is impossible to pursue peace 
without alleviating poverty and inequality. 
However, groups that express opposition 
to governmental policy and are politically 
more in line with the guerrillas have been 
violently repressed. Assassinations of com-
munity and labor leaders, journalists, and 
activists are common and contribute to a 
general stifling of political dissent. With-
out the participation of civil society, demo-
cratic reform will remain elusive and Co-
lombia will continue to be racked with vio-
lence. US lawmakers need to keep this in 
mind when creating foreign policy. 
CUSLAR operates under the assump-
tion that a clearer understanding of what is 
really happening in Colombia is necessary 
to affect positive change. By sharing his 
experiences with residents of our commu-
nity, Javier inspires us to change what he 
and the people of Colombia cannot-a US 
foreign policy that is responsible for the 
suffering and inequality of so many. He 
offers us an opportunity to support 
struggles for peace, justice, and 
sustainability and reminds us that it is pos-
sible to create policies that will alleviate 
poverty and injustice, promote peace and 
respect for human rights in Colombia. 
CUSLAR's job is to make his voice heard 
as. loudly as possible. 
Marcie Ley is Coordinator of the Commit-
tee on US-Latin American Relations 
(CUSLAR), which received a multi-year 
grant from RESIST For more informa-
tion, contact CUSLAR, 316 Anabel 
Taylor Hall, Cornell University, Ithaca, 
NY 14850; www.rso.cornell.edu/cuslar. 
They Can Walk With Their Heads Up 
An Interview with MST Member Joao Pedro Stedile 
CYNTHIA PETERS & 
JUSTINPODUR 
A fter a recent visit to Brazil, Jean Ziegler, 
J-\uN special rapporteur on the right to 
food, said, "In Brazil, where there is fertile 
land, wealth and a tropical climate, hunger 
is not a destiny." Rather, it is "the product 
of a totally unjust order. Those who die of 
hunger in Brazil are assassinated." 
Brazilian government officials were out-
raged by Ziegler's strong words, and 
pointed to their recent successes in improv-
ing health care and education, and in lift-
ing millions out of extreme poverty. Still, 
the government does not dispute the fact 
that 40,000 Brazilians die every year of hun-
ger and malnutrition-related diseases, and 
that more than 23 million of Brazil's 170 mil-
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The sign reads: "No USA, resistance is 
necessary, long live Brazil!" Photo by 
Rabble, courtesy Brazil Independent Media Center 
lion people are malnourished. 
How has Latin America's most resource-
rich country ended up with such a large 
part of its population struggling to survive? 
Brazil's recent decades of dictatorship and 
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still powerful military, its high concentra-
tion of wealth and landownership, and its 
struggle to develop under the weight of 
immense debt and IMF-enforced neoliberal 
economic policies have contributed to a 
fractured and impoverished society. 
Historical Context 
In the early 1960s, populist president 
Joao Goulart antagonized the US-allied Bra-
zilian military by instituting rent controls, 
seizing unused lands, nationalizing the 
petroleum industry, and restricting the re-
patriation of profits by foreign investors. 
Brazilian generals staged a coup in 1964, 
ushering in a 21-year military dictatorship 
that violently suppressed opposition po-
litical parties, independent labor unions, 
continued on page eight 
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student movements, and landless workers' 
organizations. It also presided over the so-
called Brazilian economic miracle--a dozen 
or so years of rapid growth financed by 
loans from foreign banks. This left the gen-
eral population a legacy of huge interest pay-
ments and punitive economic policies. 
After a sustained economic crisis in the 
1970s and early 1980s the military dictator-
ship signed an austerity agreement with 
the IMF in 1983. Being the world's largest 
debtor nation affected Brazil's poor in pre-
dictable ways. In order to generate cash to 
make interest payments on the debt, more 
and more land was put towards cash crops 
like coffee and soy, displacing hundreds 
of thousands of subsistence farmers. 
Many fled to the cities, where they settled 
in burgeoning shantytowns. Others were 
relocated to places such as the Amazonian 
Rondonia, where they cleared forests in an 
effort to farm the land. Brazil suffers not just 
from its immense foreign debt, but also from 
the hidden costs of environmental destruc-
tion, many internally displaced people, and 
an impoverished rural population-what 
many Brazilians call the "social debt." 
Progressive Resistance 
Unions and the fragments of the Brazil-
ian left that had survived 15 years of dicta-
torship founded the left-wing Workers' 
Party (PT) in 1979. [In subsequent years] 
grassroots social change movements grew, 
such as the Landless Workers' Movement 
(Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem 
Terra, or MST), and of opposition political 
parties such as the PT. Since the return to 
elections in 1988, the PT bas won key state 
and local elections, and instituted impor-
tant reforms. 
The MST, with support from the Catho-
lic Church, began its struggle in 1985, tak-
ing over an unused plantation in the south 
of the country. The occupiers gained title 
to the land two years later. Since then, the 
MST has helped 300,000 families settle on 
previously idle land, while close to 100,000 
other families are living on land they have 
occupied, waiting for government recogni-
tion. In May 2000, 30,000 MST members 
took over federal buildings across the coun-
try in a successful bid to persuade Presi-
dent Fernando Henrique Cardoso to ad-
dress the country's extreme economic in-
equality. In response to pressure from the 
MST, Cardoso promised $1 billion in re-
Page 8 
Marchers carry a banner at the World Social Forum protest in Porto Alegre, Brazil about 
the protest against the FTAA/ALCA meetings in Buenos Aries, Brazil. Photo by Rabble, 
courtesy of Brazil Independent Media Center 
forms. In addition to its successful resettle-
ment program and considerable grassroots 
power, the MST boasts a sophisticated lit-
eracy program for adults and adolescents, 
as well as 1,000 primary schools. 
The MST is not popular among certain 
segments of Brazilian society. The police 
and military, as well as landlords' private 
gunmen, still target activists. According to 
the Roman Catholic-run Pastoral Land 
Commission, over 1,100 people were killed 
in land disputes between 1985 and 1999. 
And only 47 cases have gone to trial, lead-
ing to just 18 convictions. 
In addition to violent repression, the 
MST faces other challenges. According to 
Global Exchange, "landowners and some 
elected officials are trying to repeal the 
clause of the Brazilian constitution that 
says land should be used for social pur-
poses-and can be redistributed if it is not. 
That provision has formed the legal foun-
dation of the MST's occupations of un-
used lands." Furthermore, the World 
Bank's $2 billion "land bank" program, 
which offers loans to small farmers to pur-
chase land, is transparently designed to 
undermine the grassroots-based MST. To-
day, 3% of Brazil's population still owns 
two-thirds of the country's arable land, 
much of which lies idle. Meanwhile, mil-
lions of peasants struggle to survive by 
working in temporary agricultural jobs. 
While in Herval, in the southern state 
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of Rio Grande do Sul, Canadian activist and 
writer Justin Podur and I had the opportu-
nity to talk with Joao Pedro Stedile, a mem-
ber of the MS T's national board. 
-Cynthia Peters 
What are the MST's main achievements? 
JPS: Our most important success of all 
has been to build an organization and a 
social movement. We've won back the 
worth and dignity of the peasant. That 
has immeasurable value. It doesn't show 
up in statistics. But when a person stops 
being humiliated, stops being a slave, 
and they can walk with their head up, 
master of their own future, that's the 
most important thing we're building. 
Beyond that, over the last 18 years, 
we've gptten land for 300,000 families, and 
though many of them remain poor, nobody 
in our settlements goes hungry. Everybody 
has work all year around. There are schools 
in all the settlements. All the children go to 
school. Everyone can build their own 
home. The houses may be humble, but no-
body has to pay rent to anyone. At the 
very least, the people enjoy the basic rights 
of all people. That's what retaking the land 
means. 
We're not satisfied with these modest 
achievements. Because in Brazil there are 
four million landless families. Our struggle 
continued on page nine 
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is to broaden the movement, open up more 
battles, mobilize more people, because it's 
not just a matter of allowing a few people 
to solve their problems. This is important, 
of course. It offers an example. It's a form 
of mass education. But the fundamental 
thing is to change society, and solve the 
problems of all Brazilians, of all the poor. 
You spoke of changing society. What are 
the next steps for the MST? 
JPS: The challenges are huge. It's not 
going to be an easy struggle, nor a quick 
one. The road ahead will be rocky, not 
smooth. But there are both long-range 
struggles and more immediate ones. 
In the long term, we're doing battle 
over what may decide the future of our 
country. I'm talking· about the US 
offensive to impose the Free Trade Area 
oftheAmericas (FTAA) on the Americas 
as a whole. The FTAA is more than a 
trade agreement. It is the US government's 
plan to control our land, our wealth, our 
development, our technology, our 
currency, and our language. It would 
mean our submission to the interests of 
US capital-to the less than 500 corpora-
tions at the top. And if that happens, 
we're back to being a colony, this time 
under the rule of the United States. So we 
have to fight to keep the FTAA from 
being imposed on Brazil. And not just on 
Brazil, but on the whole of Latin America. 
What we're going to do over the course 
of the coming months and years is help 
inform the people, organize them, raise 
their consciousness. In addition to 
fighting for land, health, and shelter, we 
have to stop the FTAA. That's going to 
mean demonstrations, mass meetings, 
lots and lots of different initiatives to 
inform and politicize people. Beyond that, 
every social movement has to continue 
its own specific work- we in the landless 
movement have to keep on occupying 
more and more landed estates. Our 
compatriots who have been displaced by 
dam construction will keep on fighting 
against the dams. The unemployed 
movements in the city will broaden their 
struggles for employment. The workers 
who are threatened will keep organizing, 
like for the general strike this March. 
We're going to try and promote all these 
struggles in hopes of reawakening the 
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[W]hat gratifies us the most is hearing 
about the people in the United States, even 
if they're not a majority yet, who are 
mobilizing as well, and fighting against 
their government. 
people and reviving the mass movement 
here in Brazil. Because right now it's reced-
ing. With a revival of the mass movement, 
we can hope to change the government, 
and the reigning economic model. 
What do you think of the Workers' Party's 
participatory budget process? 
JPS: Well, there are some positive things 
about it, but also some criticisms to make. 
What are the criticisms? 
JPS: That, in the end, the people really 
only have a say over 5%-or, at the 
most, 10%-of the budget. Because the 
rest- including salaries, foreign debt 
payments, etc.-is fixed by law. All public 
budgets in Brazil have 13 % of the total 
tied up by the IMF. They're required to 
deposit this in the bank to pay the debt. 
So, for example, in this state, which is 
governed by a people's government, by 
the left; education gets 11 % of the 
budget, while the IMF gets 13%. That 
means the power of the people to change 
things through the participatory budget 
process is very limited. 
So, what's the positive side? 
JPS: It's that the participatory budget 
creates an opportunity for the people to 
voice their opinions. For the people to· 
have a say about the overall problems of 
their society. It's like an exercise that 
points toward creating a general assem-
bly of the society as a whole. Here in Rio 
Grande do Sul, we have a population of 
12 million. You can't fit 12 million people 
into a single room. But the idea of the 
participatory budget process is that 
everyone can take part and have a say. 
So the main value of the process is not 
how much of the budget people have a 
say over, but as a democratic exercise 
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that teaches people that they have a right 
to a say. 
What would you say to activists and social 
movements in North America? 
JPS: We're very interested in US social 
movements. The landless movement 
enjoys the support of solidarity commit-
tees in many US cities, which help us and 
help publicize our efforts. But what 
gratifies us the most is hearing about the 
people in the United States, even if 
they're not a majority yet, who are 
mobilizing as well, and fighting against 
their government. We understand that 
the people of the United States don't 
know the real impact of the actions of 
their government. We hope that, slowly, 
they will begin to realize that, as peoples, 
we're the same. It's like an old US 
journalist put it. He was a "cousin" or an 
"ancestor" of you who have come here 
from the United States. And he really said 
it in your honor. Because he was a social 
activist, and he went to cover the · 
Spanish Civil War, like you have come 
here to Porto Alegre. When he came 
back, he wrote a book, which was called 
No Man is a Foreigner-meaning "man" 
in the general sense. What does that 
mean? That all peoples are alike. It's 
governments and capital, which enriches 
itself from the labor of others, that are 
bad. So we have to build a great, interna-
tional alliance, which is what this forum is 
for. And we hope and expect that US 
activists, fighting in the dragon's own 
gut, will help us kill this monster. 
This article was translated from Spanish 
by Alejandro Reuss and excerpted from 
Dollars & Sense (May/June 2002). For 
more information, contact Dollars and 
Sense, 740 Cambridge Street, Cambridge, 
MA 02141; www.dollarsandsense.org 
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so that the upper classes pay something, 
rather than nothing. 
But for all this, he has also deregu-
lated the financial system. Spanish 
banks have become very involved in 
the deregulated system. He privatized 
Caracas s [sic} electrical system. US oil 
companies haven't been hindered-
they pay slightly more on the petroleum 
tax. In other words, theres been no radi-
cal or even moderate redistribution of 
income. There has been no expropria-
tion of any property-except unutilized 
farmland thats paid for in cash. Thats 
about the most conservative land re-
form you'// see anywhere in Latin 
America-market prices for the land, 
paid in cash. 4 
Despite this moderate program of eco-
nomic reform, _ Chavez has generated un-
yielding opposition from Venezuela's eco-
nomic elite. Quoting Petras again: 
Chavez is a nationalist in foreign 
policy and a social liberal in domestic 
policy. From year one, he has been in 
favor of class collaboration. The oppo-
sition isn't interested in any kind of 
class collaboration- they want it all. 
The Venezuelan opposition is in a posi-
tion to reject any kind of collaboration with 
the Chavez government precisely because 
the latter's nationalist foreign policy has 
put him on a collision course with Wash-
ington. Despite the lip-service given to the 
support of democratic leadership in Latin 
America, and Chavez's unquestioned cre-
dentials as a democratically elected leader, 
the US government has put out very clear 
signals that his ouster by undemocratic 
means would find favor. 
Such a scenario played itself out on April 
11. After months of conspiring, much </ it 
done through meetings at the US embassy 
in Caracas, an anti-Chavez rally turned vio-
lent and culminated with the death of 14 
protesters. The Chavez opposition saw an 
opportunity to act and, with expectations 
of support from the Venezuelan military and 
the US government, quickly moved to ar-
rest Chavez and declare an end to his gov-
ernment and the Bolivarian Revolution. 
Washington, in fact, did play its assigned 
role, with statements blaming Chavez and 
indicating support for his ouster. 
The coup quickly unraveled, though. 
Externally, L~tin American leaders, then 
meeting in Costa Rica, sharply rebuked the 
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undemocratic ouster of Chavez. In a rare sign 
of independence, Latin American politicians, 
including Bush's strong ally, Vicente Fox of 
Mexico, broke with Washington in a very 
public manner. This swift, strong action en-
sured that Washington's statements of sup-
port of the new government in Caracas never 
turned into direct recognition. 
Internally, the new government, headed 
by Pedro Carmona, head of the business con-
federation F edecamaras, overplayed its hand, 
dismissing the National Assembly and the 
Supreme Court and declaring void the 1999 
constitution. Carmona's heavy-handedness 
apparently alienated his military backers. 
They began to move away, allowing Chavez 
supporters within the armed forces to regroup 
and mobilize. At the same time, Chavez's 
grassroots supporters within the lower classes 
came out in mass to counter the middle-class 
opponents who had staged the April 11 
march. All of these fast-moving develop-
ments led to Chavez's reinstatement on April 
13. 
Since then, the situation has continued to 
be highly charged. After Chavez reassumed 
office, Bush Administration officials sent out 
public warnings that it was best for him to 
mend his ways. Former US president Jimmy 
Carter traveled to Caracas in early July, 2002, 
to mediate between the factions. But despite 
Chavez's offer to allow the Organization of 
American States and the United Nations to 
participate in further mediating efforts, the 
opposition failed to turn out to discussions 
sponsored by Carter. As part of the failed 
Carter-led discussions, Chavez had offered 
to the opposition that he would allow his 
presidency, which is not set to expire until 
2006, to be placed before a referendum in 
2003. 
Opposition to Chavez continues to press 
on.AJuly 11 rallytocommemoratetheApril 
11 events brought out as many as 200,000 
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people; this time no violence erupted. The 
Venezuelan Supreme Court has also used 
a loophole in the law to open the way for 
Chavez's possible indictment for alleged 
campaign financing irregularities. And, the 
main labor confederation, the CTV 
(Confederaci6n de Trabajadores 
Venezolanos) is reaching out to the Church, 
the political opposition, and business and 
academic groups to promote a call for a 
national strike to press for Chavez's resig-
nation. Meantime, Chavez is calling on 
his supporters to come to his defense. 
It is unclear how much longer Chavez 
will be able to traverse the political 
minefield placed at his feet. If he can 
weather the current crisis, fend off the in-
ternal opposition, consolidate his support 
within the armed forces, keep Washington 
at bay, and reinvigorate his popular back-
ing, he will have emerged stronger for hav-
ing been tested in this fashion. It will then 
be seen whether he can take the next step 
and move beyond his nationalist and popu-
list rhetoric to promote a program of radical 
social reform. 
Argentina 
Meanwhile, at the far end of the conti-
nent, in Argentina, unprecedented crisis and 
potential have emerged, as the second-largest 
country in South America- and in the 1990s 
the darling of the neo-liberal prophets- has 
run aground economically. 
In the 1990s, Argentina moved to stem 
one of the worst cases of hyperinflation in 
history by pegging the peso to the dollar. At 
the same time, it followed the IMF prescrip-
tion of privatizing its state sector and signifi-
cantly reducing public spending. But, after 
an initial influx of capital from privatization, 
the Argentine economy begun to stall as it 
experienced the reverberations of economic 
shocks in Mexico, Asia, Russia, and Brazil. 
As investment capital began to dry up, and 
Argentine exports suffered due to an over-
priced peso, the Argentine government of the 
Peronist Carlos Menem parlayed its good re-
lationship with Washington and the IMF into 
government loans intended to prop up its 
sagging economy- generating a foreign debt 
of $132 billion, the largest in the world. 
Borrowing from Peter in order to pay 
Pablo was a sure formula for Argentina to 
secure short-term solvency by delaying an 
inevitable financial collapse. The collapse 
hit in December 2001. Even though IMF-
imposed austerity measures had generated 
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an official unemployment rate of around 20 
percent, IMF pressures continued. Despite 
Argentine government pleas to ease up 
and provide short-term reliefin the form of 
capital it could use to service an impend-
ing debt payment, the IMF continued to 
apply a political and economic tourniquet. 
Neo-liberal pundits in the United States 
went on the attack, declaring that the Ar-
gentine crisis was due to a profligate popu-
lation that was unwilling to tighten its belt 
and meet its debt obligations. 
Backed into a comer, and facing severe 
capital shortage and a run on the banks 
that had generated over $1 billion in with-
drawals at the end ofNovember, in Decem-
ber the Radical Party government of 
F emando de la Rua imposed a limit on bank 
withdrawals of 250 pesos a week. The gov-
ernment also announced that privatized 
pension funds would be replaced by gov-
ernment bonds in order to free up capital 
to continue servicing the debt. These mea-
sures provoked the middle class to join the 
working class, whose leadership had called 
for a general strike in mid-December. 
Massive unrest broke out in Argentina's 
major cities on December 19, leading to de 
la Rua's resignation on December 20 when 
the army refused to come out in support of 
his government. After ten tempestuous 
days that saw the exit of three provisional 
presidents, Congress selected Peronist 
Senator Eduardo Duhalde, de la Rua's main 
opponent in the 1999 elections, to complete 
de la Rua's term. Duhalde, however, has 
been equally unable to stem the economic 
collapse and the popular unrest. He did win 
concessions from provincial governors to 
reduce transfers from the national budget, 
but the IMF has continued to maintain pres-
sure, announcing in early July that a team 
of advisors would travel to Argentina at 
the end of the month to suggest ways of 
reforming the banking sector, but refusing 
to extend hope that a new influx of capital 
would be forthcoming. 
The Bush administration appears intent 
on maintaining a hard-line policy, intoning 
the neo-liberal mantra that Argentina's 
problems are its own fault. Not so, accord-
ing to Columbia University professor Jo-
seph Stiglitz, former vice-president and 
chief economist at the World Bank, and 
winner of the 2001 Noble prize in economics: 
The disaster comes not from not listen-
ing to the IMF, but rather from listen-
ing. ... Given the exchange rate, given 
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the economic depression which the IMF 
po/ides had already brought about, 
given the huge debt, given that the IMF 
did not provide any convincing eco-
nomic strategy to get out of the mess, 
given that there were open capital mar-
kets so that anyone who wanted to could 
move their investments to safer havens 
elsewhere in the world, it was highly 
unlikely that anyone-especially when 
the government signed an agreement to 
reduce its deficit further, predictably 
causing more unemployment and lower 
output-would start investing more. 5 
Given the absence of new capital re-
sources, Argentine bank deposits have re-
mained frozen. Many in the middle class 
have lost most of their life-savings, and the 
devalued peso has lost more than 70 per-
cent of its value since the beginning of 
2002. With greater austerity measures sig-
naled, the working class, and in particular 
the unemployed, have also been severely hit. 
The one bright light in the cavernous 
pit into which Argentine society has fallen 
is that the mobilization which brought 
down the de la Rua government in Decem-
ber has remained unabated. Currently, the 
government is experiencing a wave of re-
current actions as a result of the death of 
two unemployed youth in a confrontation 
with police during a protest action on June 
26. On July 9, Argentina's Independence 
Day, 35,000 people marched on the Plaza 
de Mayo, where the president's palace is 
located. This was the second mass dem-
onstration in as many weeks, with a third 
one called for the third week in July. These 
demonstrations have brought together sec-
tors of the labor movement, the unem-
ployed, human rights groups, left-wing 
political parties, students, and neighbor-
hood committees which emerge~ from the 
December mobilizations. 
There are also ongoing expressions of 
a developing alliance between "piqueteros 
y cacerolas" (strikers and potters-the lat-
ter referring to the practice of middle-class 
housewives of banging pots as a sign 
of protest which originated in Chile 
against the Pinochet regime), calls for 
"una segunda independencia" ( a second 
independence movement), and the re-
moval of president Duahlde and the 
IMF. Given this ongoing pressure, 
Duahlde, with the clear backing of the 
Bush Administration, has called for 
early elections in March 2003 to release 
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some pressure from the cooker. 
What Lies Ahead? 
It is unclear where Argentina's deepen-
ing political and economic crisis, combined 
with mounting popular mobilization, will 
lead. So far, the military has remained at the 
margin, but, as is clear in Colombia and 
Venezuela, the Bush Administration's com-
mitment to peace and democracy in Latin 
America is an easily discarded rhetorical 
posture. Will the growing unrest in Argen-
tina lead to the development of a broad-
based grassroots political movement that 
will challenge the political and economic 
status quo? What response would be gen-
erated from the Argentine oligarchy, politi-
cal class, military, and the US government? 
And what will be the impact from other re-
gional developments, in particular the Oc-
tober elections in Brazil, where Worker's 
Party candidate, Luiz Inacio Lula de Silva 
(Lula) is the front-runner? The unpredict-
ability of current circumstances suggests 
that there is much to watch for in Argen-
tine developments. 
Colombia, Venezuela, and Argentina-
each in itself, and all three together-
clearly point to the imminent potential for 
deepening conflict in South America. They 
also raise the possibility that a new cen-
tury may indeed bring about a new begin-
ning for people in Latin America. 
Jorge Rogachevsky is a member of 
RESIST's Board of Directors and teaches 
Spanish and Latin American Studies at 
St. Mary's College of Maryland. 
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Resist awards grants six times a year to 
groups throughout the United States en-
gaged in activism for social and economic 
justice. In this issue of the Newsletter we 
list a few grant recipients from our June 
2002 allocation cycle. For information, con-
tact the groups at the addresses below. 
Committee in Solidarity 
with Central American 
· People (CISCAP) 
458 Blair Blvd. , Eugene, OR 97402 
ciscap@efn.org 
CISCAP has organized for the past 20 
years to counter US economic and mili-
tary interventions across Latin America. 
In the last year, CISCAP branched out to 
facilitate a number of coalitions focusing 
on immigrant and economic justice issues 
and started a Colombia Interest Group in 
response to US Plan Colombia. CISCAP 
has been very successful at emphasizing 
the relationships between unjust eco-
nomic and social policies within the US 
and in Latin America. 
Resist awarded CISCAP $2,000 for 
general support for their work around 
eentral American solidarity organizing. 
Filipino American Coalition 
for Environmental Solutions 
16 West 32nd Street, Suite 1 0B2 
New York, NY 10001 
www.f acessolutions. org 
The Filipino American Coalition for Envi-
ronmental Solutions (FACES) operates 
nationally through local chapters to 
engage Filipino American communities in 
organizing around the environmental 
effects of US military bases in the Philip-
pines. Through their military base clean-
up campaign, FACES hopes to increase 
the capacity ofFilipino communities to 
take political action against environmen-
tal racism. 
Resist awarded FACES a $3,000 grant 
for general support. 
Seattle Young People's Project 
123 21st Avenue, Seattle, WA 98122 
www.sypp.org 
For the last 10 years, the Seattle Young 
People's Project (SYPP) has been empow-
ering youth for social change in their 
own communities by providing a sup-
portive framework for youth-led organiz-
•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
Join the Resist Pledge Program! 
We'd like you to consider 
becoming a Resist Pledge. 
Pledges account for over 30% 
of our income. · 
By becoming a pledge, you help guarantee 
Resist a fixed and dependable source of 
income on which we can build our grant-
making program. In return, we will send 
you a monthly pledge letter and reminder 
along with your newsletter. We will also 
keep you up-to-date on the groups we 
have funded and the other work being 
done at Resist. 
So take the plunge and become a 
Resist Pledge! We count on you,and 
the groups we fund count on us. 
• I'll send you my pledge of $ __ 
every month/quarter/six months/year 
(please circle one). 
• Enclosed is an initial pledge 
contribution of $ ___ . 
• Please automatically deduct my 
pledge from my credit card (below). 
• I can't join the pledge program 
now, but here's a contribution of 
$ ___ to support your work. 
Name ________________________ _ 
Address _______________________ _ 
Phone Number (for confirmation only) ____________ _ 
Visa/Master Card# ___________________ _ 
Expiration Date _____________________ _ 
• 
• 
• Resist • 259 Elm Street • Somervme • MA • 02144. Donations are tax-deductible. • 
•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
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ing. SYPP allows young people the op-
portunity to initiate and implement their 
own organizing projects. Through the 
Youth Undoing Institutional Racism 
Project, youth organizers are working on 
a two-pronged campaign: confronting 
institutional racism within their own 
schools while countering military recruit-
ment at Seattle's Public Schools. 
Resist awarded the Seattle Young 
People's Project $3,000 for their Youth 
Undoing Institutional Racism Project. 
Southeast Regional Welfare 
Rights Network 
5808 Wexford Lane 
Knoxville, TN 37921; Jay8@icx.net 
The Southeast Regional Welfare Rights 
Network is a newly emerging organiza-
tion that seeks to organize a cohesive 
force to change welfare policy on both 
the state and federal levels. Coming from 
a perspective that organizing for justice 
in the South requires a unique set of 
strategies, the Regional Network will 
work throughout the area to challenge 
TANF and other welfare policies. 
Resist awarded the Southeast 
Regional Welfare Rights Network $2,000 
to hold the first welfare rights confer-
ences in the South organized by 
grassroots organizations. 
Young Women United 
PO Box 12261 
Albuquerque, NM 87195 
Young Women United is a new organiza-
tion founded by and for young women to 
protect and build the organizing strength 
of young women of color. Through their 
Circle of Strength program, Young 
Women United offers training and leader-
ship development for teenage women to 
organize around health and violence 
issues in their lives. The program serves 
to raise consciousness of the multiple 
oppressions encountered in young 
women's lives, while empowering them to 
take action within their communities. 
Resist awarded Young Women United 
$3,000 for the Circle of Strength program. 
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